On August 18, 2020, a coup d’état took place in Mali, where an incipient transtion was taking place since the 2012 military coup and war. After that, the country experienced a new military coup, now a military-to-military one, on May 24, 2021. Then, as pieces of a domino, Burkina Faso (January 24, 2022 and September 22, 2022) and Niger (July 26, 2023) suffered the same fate.

One of the main reasons given by the putschists was the security problem and, furthermore, the State’s weak capacity against terrorist groups that have been generating chaos, violence and death in regions like the Sahel and West Africa. Therefore, it is proper to analyze if the promises (a better security situation) made by the militaries (now, dictators) have been achieved or if they failed.

In this article, the security situation in the three previously mentioned countries will be analyzed, but in a general view, that is, taking into account the national figures and not the regional or local numbers. This latter issue will be analyzed in another document. Then, with both views (national and regional), it will be confirmed if the national and local trends are similar or if there are regions where violence has been declining.

Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy | August 13, 2024

Mali, from one putsch to another……and still a lot of violence

During Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, Mali’s President since September 4, 2013, who was ousted by a military junta on August 18, 2020, the country registered 3,420 violent incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). The battles and violence against civilians where the most frequent incidents, with 1,078 and 1,071 cases, respectively, and far from the other categories, such as explosions/remote violence (513) and strategic developments (311). Proportionally, VAC was equivalent to 31,32% of the total registered incidents. Finally, there were 1,29 incidents per day during all IBK’s term.

So, what happened after the military coups of 2020 and 2021? The amount of violent incidents rose up to 7,159, with VAC leading with 2,415 cases and being followed by the battles (1,701), strategic developments (1,496) and explosions/remote violence (1,046). The share of VAC se remained very similar to the previous period (33,73%). Nevertheless, to understand well the trends, it is important to compare the incidents per day figures. This latter one showed an impressive increase, as the numbers went up from 1,29 incidents per day during IBK’s era to 6,63 after its fall. Even more, since the second military coup, the figure is even worse, with 7,68 incidents per day.

In relation to the fatalities, there were 7,972 in IBK’s period, with an average of 3,0 deaths per day, while after the two military coups the numbers increased up to 9,912 fatalities and 9,18 deaths per day.

In brief, the figures show that the general situation of the country has not improved and, in fact, the security has declined, with more violent incidents and more fatalities. However, the deaths per violents events rate had slowed its path, as it fell from 2,33 during IBK’s term to 1,38 since the two military coups took place.

Burkina Faso

In this country, the situation is similar to Mali’s one, as the incipient democratic transition was pulverised by two military coups in a short lapse (both in 2022 and separated by nearly 8 months). Nevertheless, the contexts are different, as Mali’s transitional period was longer and seemed to be more solid. Also, while Mali has been in war since 2012, Burkina Faso has not experienced that, so the scenario in which the putschs developed were not very much alike.

Concerning the violence in Burkina Faso, during Roch Kaboré’s era (former President, until he was ousted from power), ACLED registered 4,516 violent incidents, with violence against civilians (1,568), battles (933), strategic developments (705) and explosions/remote violence (560) as the main types of violence. While VAC represented the 34,72% of the total incidents, the number of incidents per day was 2,04.

In relation to the military regimes, 4,917 violent incidents were recorded, with VAC in the first place (1,306), followed by strategic developments (1,297), explosions/remote violence (990) and battles (956). VAC represented 26,56% of the total number of registered incidents and there were 5,11 incidents per day. As it can be seen, the figures establish that the security situation worsened, as there were not only more incidents but, the most relevant, more incidents per day.

Lastly, the fatalities also allow to have a better view of the country’s situation. While the deaths during Kabore’e period reached 7,787, with an average of 3,51 fatalities per day, since the military took power 17,613 people lost their lives, with a notable increase in the fatalities per day, as it rose up to 18,31. Furthermore, the rate of dead people per incident grew from 1,72 in Roch Kabore’s term to 3,58 during the military rule.

The above-mentioned numbers are very convincing and it is evident that the situation has not improved, at least in a general view, in Burkina Faso.

Niger

Mohamed Bazoum served as the country’s President between April 2, 2021 and July 26, 2023. During his term, ACLED recorded 1,726 violent incidents, with VAC (723), strategic developments (598) and battles (277) leading. VAC represented 41,89% of the total and the rate of incidents per days along this period reached 2,04.

Then, since the military coup, the number of violent incidents rose up to 850, being clearly led by strategic developments (331), VAC (200) and battles (155). While VAC were equivalent to 23,53% of the total, there were 2,21 incidents per day. Therefore, it can be said that VAC decreased (this is something good) and the figure related to the daily average of violent incident stayed stabilized.

However, the fatalities item expresses important differences. If the total amount of deaths was higher during Bazoum’s term (2,463 against 1,813 since the military coup), the fatalities per day showed the reality as it is: 2,91 dead people in a daily basis along Bazoum’s period and 4,72 under the military rule. So, it can be stated that the incidents became more lethal since Bazoum was ousted from power.

Conclusions

As said in the introduction of this article, this is only a first approach of the phenomenon, which will give some relevant information but it will not be sufficient to elaborate irrefutable statements or conclusions. Nevertheless, this first step (a general view of the situation) will allow to detect some trends, especially in the figures about violent incidents in the three studied countries. It will be necessary, and that will be the work of a further analysis, to see if in the local or regional level can be identified different trajectories that complement or refute the main conclusions of this work.

Far beyond from this, it is evident that the security situation has not improved in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger since the military took power from presidents that had come to power in a democratic and clean way. For example, the fatalities per event rate has been increasing since 2021 (see Figure 1). The same happens with the fatalities per day (Figure 2), violent incidents per day (Figure 3) and total number of dead people. About this latter one, 2024 is not taken into account, as the present year is still in progress.

In a deeper analysis, Niger’s situation is characterised by an increase of the daily rate of violent incidents since the last military coup. The only exception is violence against civilians. On the other hand, Burkina Faso and Mali have bigger numbers in battles, strategic developments, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians. However, Mali fatalities per event rate has decreased after IBK was removed by the military juntas.

In brief, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger still suffer from violence and their situation has worsened since the military coups ended the democratic rule. Niger’s figures seem to be better in comparison to Burkina Faso and Mali, but the militaries came to power recently, so it is yet to be observed its trajectory in the security issue. Finally, it can be concluded that the military coups and the following administration of military juntas were not able to improve the security situation in the three countries.

Appendix

Figure 1 – Fatalities per violent incident in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (2012-2024)

Figure 2 – Violent incidents per day in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger

Figure 3 – Violent incidents per day in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger